I.
Character Evidence (for the text of the referenced rules, see infra pp. 12-16) A.
Admissible either as substantive evidence (Rules 5-404 through 5-406) or only as to credibility (impeachment or rehabilitation, Rules 5-608, 5-609, and 5-616).
B. "The propensity rule" and its exceptions.
1. "The propensity rule" generally excludes evidence of a person's other acts or a person's character or character trait to show that the person acted "in character" on the occasion at issue in the case. Rule 5-404(a)(1) and (b).
EXAMPLE: Plaintiff sues for severe injuries she alleges were caused by defendant's driving his truck through a red light.
a.
Evidence that the plaintiffor the defendant is generally a bad driver is offered to show that the plaintiff or the defendant drove badly this time. Ruling: _______ _ b.
Evidence that either one has driven through other red lights at other times is offered. Ruling: ________ _
[But, as to criminal cases, see Sessoms v. State, _ Md. _ (Sept. Term, 1999 , No. 68, Jan. 11,2000 where the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's exclusion of evidence that the rape prosecutrix's brother was accused of robbing a third party hours after the alleged rape. Judge Cathell, writing for the court, stated:
We hold that the test for admitting other crimes evidence in criminal proceedings enunciated in Faulkner generally does not apply to crimes, wrongs, or acts committed by someone other than a criminal defendant. * * * Because this rule is premised upon protecting an accused from undue prejudice, it does not apply to exclude other crimes evidence involving alleged actions by others testifying in the criminal proceedings. This is especially so when the evidence is crucial to the defense in a criminal proceeding and concerns impeachment of a witness with a possible prejudice, bias, interest, or motive to falsely testify.
Judge Wilner, dissenting, joined by Judges Rodowsky and Raker, would have affirmed the trial judge's decision as an appropriate exercise of discretion under Rule 5-403. The brother already had been impeached by his prior convictions for robbery, including one the day after the alleged rape.
2.
Exceptions to the propensity rule are carved out in several Rules. May the defense call a character witness to testify to the plaintiffs bad reputation for truthfulness, or to the witness's opinion that the plaintiff is generally a liar? Ruling:
IV.
May the character witness testify as to whether he or she believes the plaintiffs testimony in the case to be truthful? Ruling:
d. Exception for rehabilitation: a witness whose credibility has been impeached in such a way as to constitute an attack on the witness's character for truthfulness (usually one or more of the three methods in c. above, but the trial judge may find that, ~, a particular impeachment by a prior inconsistent statement amounted to such an attack) may be rehabilitated by reputation or opinion evidence as to the witness's good character trait for truthfulness and veracity. Rules 5-608(a)(2) and (3)(A), 5-404(a)(1)(C), and 5-616(c)(3).
-3-EXAMPLE: After the impeachment in c.i., ii., or iii. above, may plaintiff call a character witness who will testify to plaintiffs good reputation for truthfulness, or that, in the character witness's opinion, the plaintiff is generally a truthful person? Ruling: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ C. Admission of character evidence to prove something other than propensity. Evidence of specific instances of Plaintiffs using illegal drugs? Ruling:
Methods of proof when "character witnesses" testify (in civil or criminal cases, as to a principal witness's truthfulness and veracity, under Rule 5-608(a); and, in criminal cases, under Rule 5-404(a)(1)(A) and (B)).
1. Direct examination: reputation or opinion testimony, but not specific instances. Rules 5-405(a) and 608(a)(1), (2), and (3),
-4 -2. Cross-examination: character witness may be asked about knowledge of specific instances of the principal witness's conduct that would lead to a reputation or opinion different than that to which the character witness testified. Rules 5-405(a) and 5-608(a)(4).
EXAMPLE: Assume that the Plaintiff has testified and is being impeached by a character witness.
a. Direct examination of reputation witness: proponent establishes that the character witness and the Plaintiff are members of the same community (residential, work, school, etc.) ; that Plaintiff has a reputation in that community as to character for truthfulness; and that that reputation is bad. held that the trial judge should have permitted the defense to elicit from its witness the specific matters on which the witness based his opinion, first, so as to "convince the trial judge that the witness possesses an adequate basis for forming an opinion as to another person's character." 76 Md. App. At 134. Secondly, Hemingway held that the jury also should hear this evidence:
This does not mean, however, that the basis for the character witness's opinion, if admitted, has no relevance to the weight ascribed to that opinion by the jury. Clearly, the bald conclusion of the witness without any reason to support it hardly commends the opinion for serious consideration by the trier of the fact.
Id. at 135.
Thus, Hemingway mandated the courts' permitting the character witness to state what it was that led him or her to form the opinion to which the witness wished to testify. e.
Hemingway v. State was overruled by Title 5, in an effort to keep the direct testimony of a character witness short and sweet, i.e., to limit it to reputation or opinion.
It was believed undesirable to open up side issues as to whether specific instances that led the character witness to form an opinion occurred or not --particularly when the character evidence is tangential, anyway. (The Rules permit specific instances to be proved on direct when character is an "essential element of a charge, claim, or defense." See C.2. supra, p. 4.) Indeed, if one could testify to the specific instances that led to one's opinion, the opinion testimony would be superfluous and inadmissible under Rule 5-701, as unhelpful to the jury. FRE 608 is rather obtusely written. Md. Rule 5-608 was re-written in an effort to clarify, but not depart substantively from FRE 608 (except that the Md. Rule rej ects one federal case [as well as two 19th century Maryland cases] that permits character witnesses to testify to whether they believe the other witness's trial testimony).
For example, Md. Rule 5-608(a)(3)(B) explicitly states that the character witness on direct "may give a reasonable basis for -6-testimony as to reputation or an opinion ... , but may not testify as to specific acts of truthfulness or untruthfulness .... " This is declarative of the federal case law construing the federal rule.
The Federal Rule advisory committee's note provides that opinion testimony ought in general to "be confmed to the nature and extent of observation and acquaintance upon which the opinion is based. found that the trial court had erred in not permitting a defense character witness to explain, in front of the jury, that the reason she was of the opinion that one of the defendant's cohorts, a key State's witness, was a "compulsive liar," was because he told her "inconsistent stories about different things."
The trial judge had permitted her to testify before the jury to how long she had known the State's witness and how often she spoke with him.' It heard her testimony about "inconsistent 2THE COURT: Now, I sustained that objection on the basis that I conclude at this point there's not been an adequate basis for that opinion to be given, but ... I'll give you the opportunity at least to attempt to establish that basis while we're out of the presence of the jury. THE COURT: Sustained.
["A lot of the stories that he told me didn't add up, saying that-one day he would tell me something that happened on that day and then a couple of days later he would tell me something else that had happened on that day that wouldn't have been able to happen if what he said before was true." Goff added that this happened "repeatedly." Jensen v. State, Md. App., Sept. Term, 1997 , No. 1768 ).
* * * * * * * THE COURT: Under the circumstances, it seems to me that testimony given by Ms. Goff supports a basis from the information for her perception of these conversations for giving evidence as to the truthfulness or not ofMr. Wooldridge, and I'm going to allow this course of examination to continue. ******* (The jury returned to the courtroom). At the bench, the State argued that the defense had already laid the foundation and elicited the desired opinion, adding: "It's our position that those are specific instances (inaudible). He's done what he's been allowed to do under the rules, and that is (inaudible) opinion, and I don't think he should be allowed to go any further." In response, defense counsel claimed that "telling stories over and over again" was "not a specific act, that's an opinion." The trial court noted that Rule 5-608(a)(3)(B) prohibits a character witness from testifying about specific instances of truthfulness or untruthfulness and reasoned that any response would be "sort of a continuum of events ... no more than a number of specific events tied together, which I think will create the same mischief as is intended to be prevented by the rule .... " When defense counsel asserted that "the jury has a right to know what the basis is," the court declared, "No, I don't think that's it at all. I think you've gotten out of this witness on the subject what the rule intends for you to be able to get."
Md. App. opinion at 15.
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In the majority opinion authored by Judge Raker, the Court held that the procedure waS an erroneous abuse of discretion. 4 It rejected the State's argument that "reasonable basis evidence properly is limited to how long and under what circumstances the witnesses have been acquainted." 355 Md. at 696. 5 The majority characterized the excluded evidence as "not evidence of 'specific instances, '" id. at 700, which it said would not be permitted on direct.
4The majority found the error to be harmless, in light of overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt. Chief Judge Bell, joined by Judge Eldridge, dissented, on the ground that the error was so serious as to be reversible.
5 Judge Chasanow, concurring and dissenting, concluded, on the other hand:
It is quite clear that [Md. Rule 5-608(a)(3)(B)] is intended to allow the character witness to express the reasonable basis for arriving at an opinion, not the reasonable basis for the opinion arrived at.
* * *
In order for a character witness to testify about the untruthful character or bad reputation for truthfulness of another witness, the character witness should establish a basis of knowledge. * * *
In the instant case, the testimony at issue was that "[a] lot of the stories that he told me didn't add up" and "one day he would tell me something that happened on that day and then a couple days later he would tell me something [absolutely inconsistent with the fIrst version)." This testimony is far more analogous to the prohibited specifIc acts of untruthfulness than to the permissible basis for knowledge of the witness's character. I do not believe the trial judge abused his discretion in prohibiting this testimony.
355 Md. at 722, 724-26 (emphasis added).
The Court of Special Appeals similarly reasoned:
As we previously indicated, the substance of Goff s testimony in chambers was that Wooldridge "repeatedly" told her things that turned out to be untrue. From appellant's perspective, this amounted to a general statement about Wooldridge's character. From the trial court's perspective, however, Goffs testimony concerned a pattern of conduct that was predicated on numerous specifIc occurrences. Because Rule 5-608 permits, but does not mandate, introduction of evidence about the basis of the witness's belief, the trial court properly weighed the value of Goffs testimony in establishing how she formed her opinion against the danger that the jury would interpret her testimony as merely a summary of instances of dishonesty, introduced in lieu of a detailed description of each instance.
It is clear from the record that the trial court was persuaded that the jury would perceive Goffs testimony as a "continuum" of specifIc events. Nonetheless, the court permitted the witness to tell the jury about the extent of her contact with appellant over a period of time. This testimony, if believed, indicated that Goffs testimony was not a "bald conclusion" .... Indeed, Goffs description of how long, and under what circumstances, she had known Wooldridge provided the jury with an ample basis to evaluate her opinion. Therefore, we perceive no abuse of discretion .... Md. App. opinion at 19.
-10-The majority acknowledged that "Rule 5-608 unquestionably intended to modify Maryland law, in particular, Hemingway v. State, 76 Md. App. 127,543 A.2d 879 (1988) , to the extent that specific instances of truthfulness or untruthfulness were not admissible on direct examination of a witness." 355 Md. at 706. As the majority aptly explained:
Maryland's Rule 608(a)(3)(B) is based on Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b), which in tum is related to Federal Rule of Evidence 405(b) on specific instances evidence. The advisory committee's note to Federal Rule 405 explains that although specific instances are the most convincing character evidence, that type of evidence also "possesses the greatest capacity to arouse prejudice, to confuse, to surprise, and to consume time." See also COURT OF ApPEALS OF MARYLAND STANDfNG COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, PROPOSED TITLE 5 OF THE MARYLAND RULES OF PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 5-608 Reporter's Note (Subcommittee Draft 1991) (on file with Committee) (explaining that "routinely permitting such proof would distract and unduly influence juries and create too many time-consuming side issues."). As these notes suggest, once a witness testifies to a specific instance, the jury's focus necessarily turns to whether in fact that particular event occurred and the circumstances surrounding that event.
Id. at 699-700 (emphasis added). Yet the majority concluded:
In contrast, because [the character witness's] statement that [the State's witness] often told her mutually inconsistent stories spoke to a general trait and not to particular occasions on which he lied, it would not serve to distract and confuse the jury, nor would it consume time by altering the focus of the trial to other particular events.
Id. at 700.
Quaere as to what happens, under this ruling, to the scope of cross? Must not the opposing counsel be permitted to probe into the specific "inconsistent stories," if counsel believes that will show them to be insubstantial? The scope of cross becomes much broader than simply asking about specific instances that did not go to form the witness's opinion, but would lead to the opposite opinion --which is all that FRE 608( a) permits and that this writer understood that Rule 5-608(a)( 4) was intended to permit.
The Jensen majority states:
It is fair to infer from the Rule and its history that the committee felt that a character witness was entitled to some latitude in informing the jury as to the basis for an opinion, so long as that person avoids venturing into the troublesome area of specific instances. Permitting such latitude allows the witness, within reason, to offer something to the jury beyond a bare conclusion that the witness "is a truthful person" or "is not a truthful person." Accordingly, we hold that the trial court
